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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~ ~ 
~
Cert to CA t-:::..-,A. .:;~ -:-· 





1. · SUMMARY: 
Carolina v. Pearce, 
417 u~s. 21 (1974), 
Applying this Court's decisions in No!!b_ { ~ 
395 U.S. J:Cl (1969) and Blackledge v. ~.~ 
CA 6 held that the prosecutor violated due~ . 
process when he secured an indictment under an habitual-offender 
statute after a state defendant refused to plead guilty to a 
less serious offense. The Warden seeks certiorari. 
2. FACTS: Resp was 
e~suing plea 
the prosecutor warned resp that if he did not plead guilty, 
- "'---"=" "-------' 
he would be charged under the habitual criminal statute, 
which carried a life sentence. Resp refused and insisted ________________ ,, ____ ~~ 
on going to trial on the forgery count. The prosecutor 
thereupon secured an indictment against ~esp under the 
habitual offender statute. Resp was convicted on both 
counts, and, pursuant to the trial judge's instructions, 
was sentenced by the jury to a mandatory life sentence. The 
...____ --------- -
Kentucky appellate courts affirmed the conviction over resp's 
due-process claim. 
Resp then sought federal habeas relief. The District 
Court (E.D.Ky.)(Moynahan, J.) denied relief, concluding 
simply that resp assumed the risk of a life sentence: 
CA 6 reversed. 
"[T]he petitioner chose to risk 
the maximum sentence of life im-
prisorunent under the Kentucky ha-
bitual criminal statute by elect~ 
ing to proceed to trial, rather 
than accepting a sentence of 5 
years in return for a plea of 
guilty to the forgery charge .... " 
Petn, at 2f. 
The court, per Judge McCree, held that 
the plea-bargaining process had been impermissibly abused by 
~--------------------------------------------------------the prosecutor's attempt "to coerce an unwilling defendant 
--- ---------------~----------------------------------------into foregoing his constitutional right to trial." Id., at 
4a. The prosecutor's actions in this case, the court con-
*/ 
eluded, were plainly based on vindictiveness;- accordingly, 
~I 
During sentencing . proceedings, the prosecutor inquired 
of resp: " ... isn't it a fact that I told you that if you did not 
intend to save the court the ... necessity of a trial ... that I in-
tended to return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you 
based upo.n these prior felony convictions?" Id., at 3a n. 2. 
( "we hold that due process has been offended by placing [resp] 
in fear of retaliatory action for insisting upon his constitu-
tional right to stand trial." . Id., at 7a. 
3. CONTENTIONS: CA 6, in the Warden's view, has im-
properly hampered the plea-bargaining process. Admitting that 
the prosecutor attempted "to create natural coercive impact on 
the accused ... ", the Warden contends that the "vindictiveness" 
and "coercion" in this case were no greater than similar pres-
sures operating on criminal defendants at other stages of the 
criminal process. 
Resp replies that the decision below is consistent with 
Blackledge and Pearce, which hold that defendants who assert 
procedural rights must be treated in a manner that avoids any 
(~ suggestion of vindictive or retaliatory motives. 
4. DISCUSSION: Neither Pearce nor Blackledge is on all ~~~ 
fours with this case. Those decisions govern instances where 
the prosecutor has occasion to reindict the accused because 
the latter has exercised some procedural right; those cases 
therefore presented the spectacle of judges or prosecutors 
upping the ante once a defendant had already been subjected 
to a full . trial and eventually succeeded in avoiding the 
conviction by virtue of exercising a procedural right. 
That is not the case here. Resp went through the system 
only once; thus, the prosecutor used his entire arsenal against 
resp the first time around. Moreover, the very same result 
could have been achieved, again with only a singl~ trial, had 
the prosecutor simply procured the multiple-offender indictment 
at the outset and then used the more serious offense as 
leverage to secure resp's plea to the lesser charge. Since 
that procedure would have been above reproach, CA 6's re-
sult is wedded to the entirely fortuitous circumstances of 
this case. Next time, the prosecutor can avoid the due-process 
holding, while maintaining his leverage in the plea-bargaining 
process, simply by securing both indictments at the same time. 
That is a very long-winded way of saying that, at bottom, 
CA 6 may simply be exalting form above substance. 
Caveat: It is my unde~standing that due process is 
indeed concerned with "form" as well as with substance. Black-
ledge and Pearce, after all, were based on the "appearance", 
not the certainty, of vindictiveness on the part of prosecu-
tors or judges. If, then, it violates due process for prose-
cutors to act in a way that can reasonably be viewed as a 
vindictive response to the exercise of a constitutional or 
statutory right, then the Kentucky prosecutor here violated 
due process. 
There is a response and a motion to proceed ifp. 
5/21/77 Starr Ops in petn 
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September 14, 1977 
No. 76-1334 Bordenkircher v. Hayes 
This memo will record my initial reaction (tentative 
at this stage) after reading the briefs and the opinion of CA6 
(McCree) . 
Respondent was convicted of being an habitual 
criminal under Kentucky's recidivist statute that carried an 
automatic life sentence. He was indicted on the charge of 
uttering a forged check for about $88, an offense that carried 
a penalty of from two to ten years. Apparently, the evidence 
w 
against respondent was over~helming. During pretrial 
conferences with the prosecuting attorney at which 
respondent's counsel was present, the prosecutor offered to -== ....-..._.. .-. ~ :ws 
recommend a five-year sentence if respondent pled guilty. In 
these plea bargaining negotiations, the prosecutor advised 
respondent that if he elected not to plead guilty, he would be 
charged under the habitual criminal statute. Respondent chose 
not to plead guilty, and the prosecutor thereupon obtained a 
new indictment. The second indictment differed from the first 
in that Count 2 thereof charged respondent with being an 
"habitual criminal". Respondent previously had pled guilty 
2. 
to a charge of "detaining a female against her will for the 
purpose of having carnal knowledge of her", and was sentenced 
to seven years; and also had been convicted of robbery (see 
App. 12). * 
After exhausting state remedies in which the issue 
now before was duly raised, respondent sought federal habeas 
corpus relief. This was denied by the district court. That 
court also refused to issue a certificate of probable cause to 
permit an appeal because the Court thought the "appeal would 
be frivolous and not taken in good faith" (Pet for Cert 2a). 
CA6 reversed on the merits, holding that respondent had been 
denied due process by the plea bargaining tactics of the 
prosecutor: 
Although a prosecutor may in the course of plea 
negotiations offer a defendant concessions relating 
to prosecution under an existing indictment, see 
United States ex-rel. wifl lam v. McRann, 436 F.2d 103 
(2d Cir. 1970), cert den1ed, 402 U.S. 914 (1971), he 
\
may not threaten a defendant with the consequences 
that more severe charges may be brought if he insists 
on going to trial. When a prosecutor obtains an 
indictment less severe than the facts known to him at 
the time might permit, he makes a discretionary 
determination that the interests of the state are 
served by not seeking more serious charges. Cf. 
United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 
1976). Accordingly, if after plea negotiations fail, 
he then procures an indictment charging a more 
serious crime, a strong inference is created that the 
only reason for the more serious charge is 
vindictiveness. Under the circumstances, the 
* Respondent was convicted of robbery on January 18, 
sentenced to five years, but was placed on probation. 
charged with uttering a forged instrument on November 




prosecutor should be required to justify his action. 
In this case, a vindictive motive need not be 
inferred. The prosecutor has admitted it. Pet for 
Cert. 7a 
The reference above to the prosecutor admitting a 
"vindictive motive" apparently refers only to the conceded 
fact that the prosecutor had specifically advised respondent 
and his counsel that unless the guilty plea was entered, the 
prosecutor would "return to the grand jury and ask them to 
indict you based upon these prior felony convictions". 
CA6 relied primarily upon North Carolina v. Pierce, 
395 U.S. 711 and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 u.s. 21. Although 
3. 
these cases are not irrelevant, I do not view them as being in 
any sense dispositive of the present issue. In both Pierce 
and Blackledge the prosecutor had reindicted an accused 
following conviction in a trial that was overturned by the 
exercise of a constitutional right. Here, there had been no 
prior trial, and the prosecutor merely "bargained" on the 
basis of the state's right to indict for a more serious 
offense. 
I thought initially that the case was not too 
important, as it seemed to me that prosecutors could avoid its 
holding simply by indicting initially for the offense that 
carried the most severe penalty. I therefore voted at 
Conference merely to "join 3". Upon further reflection, I am 
inclined to view the case more seriously. As I read CA6's 
4. 
opinion, it enunciates a per se rule that would substantially 
curtail the flexibility of a prosecutor in plea bargaining 
discussions. Moreover, as indicated in the amicus brief filed 
by the Attorney General of Texas, there is now a square 
conflict with the Fifth Circuit case of Montgomery v. Estelle, 
decided February 25, 1977, although the mandate in that case 
was vacated and the case set for future oral argument. 
Petr's brief, after emphasizing the now recognized 
utility of plea bargaining, points out that prosecutors 
attempt to structure a case so that the defendant is 
encouraged to plead guilty rather than elect to go to trial. 
It is common knowledge that th~ already overloaded system 
could collapse if a significantly larger percentage of 
defendants elected jury trial. If prosecutors were compelled 
by the CA6 rule always to indict for the maximum possible 
penalty, the gap between the state's demand (in this case it 
would have been life) and a plea of not guilty presumably 
would have been more difficult to bridge than the difference 
between ten years and not guilty. Putting it differently, I 
would think it in the interest of defendants generally - as 
well as expediting the business of the courts - if prosecutors 
were encouraged to indict for lesser offenses. 
In any event it seems to me that the per se rule of 
CA6 goes too far. 
ss 
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FROM: Nancy Bregstein i!J-1'.(. 1/.o ~ ,...._ 1 .. ,..;-. ~ 
. ... --= .. -,- -:r,.., .......... 
76-1334 B~rdenkirc~r v. Haye~ ~~ .. ~~~ ~ 
r;-~ ~ .-££.,/~~1~ _,.) 
This case should be captioned "Th~~~ of ~e
~e:._../1-'c~ ":1. ~· ....t..~ ~ 
Vindictive Prosecutor, o~~~e There Any Limit s How Far a 
~
Prosecutor Can Go in Plea Bargaining?" ' 
~ .fSU &."-'f ~~~~ ..... ~ 
I do not mean t~b~ overly sarca~ tic, but the l 
~~ ...... ~ ,.,.,W.,...tl'-:lt.-lf',._C..C..C~---­
prosecutor's actto~s- ~n~motives in this case affront even • 
my relatively conservative sense of justice. If the Court 
meant what it said in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
to the effect that there are limits to what is permissible 
in plea bargaining, then this is the case in which to 
enforce a limit. 
2. 
I. Facts 
The facts deserve some elaboration, because they 
are not treated adequately in the briefs. These additional 
facts are not critical to resp's claim, but they emphasize 
(if it needs any additional emphasis) that the prosecutor's 
decision to re-indict resp under the habitual criminal 
statute was not based on a legitimate exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in evaluating society's interest, 
but rather was an attempt to get resp to relinquish his 
right to a trial and to punish resp for his assertion f 
constitutional rights after resp insisted on having a trial. 
In the original indictment, resp was charged with 
one count of uttering a forged instrument. He had 
presented a forged check for $88.30 to the cashier at a 
grocery store. Uttering a forged instrument carries a 
penalty of 2-10 years imprisonment. The prosecutor offered 
resp a 5-year sentence if he would plea guilty. Resp 
insisted on his innocence ("Why do you want to put pressure 
on me to cop-out before a trial of something that I didn't 
do?" App. 43) • The state may have had overwhelming 
evidence against him, but the Fifth Amendment guarantees 
resp's right to insist that he did not commit the crime and 
to put the state to its proof. 
The prosecutor threatened resp that if he insisted 
on going to trial, and thereby refused to save the state 
inconvenience and time, resp would be reindicted as an 
-
habitual offender. Conviction under the habitual offender 
statutes carries a mandatory life sentence. The two 
previous crimes of which resp had been convicted were 
~detaining a female against her will for the purpose of 
having carnal knowledge of her" a~bbery. 
The circumstances of the two prior crimes are 
revealed in resp's testimony in the state trial court. 
Resp was 17 years old when he participated in the 
commission of the first crime, detaining a female. He 
pleaded guilty and was sent to reformatory, not prison. 
Resp told the jury that at the time of the rape resp was -
3. 
involved with three other "guys", one of whom was sentenced 
to life. Resp testified, "I was seventeen years old and 
just passing through this place and they involved me in it, 
you know." App. 44. It is impossible to know what resp's 
role was, but the fact that he was sent to a reformatory 
while one of the other participants was given life suggests 
that his role was mi no r . For the second crime (robbery) 
resp was placed on probation; he served no time. 
These facts are relevant to evaluating the 
prosecutor's initial decision not to charge under the 
habitual criminal statute. In this opinion below Judge 
McGree reasoned that 
? 
"[w]hen a prosecutor obtains an indictment less 
severe than the facts known to him at the time 
might permit, he makes a discretionary 
determination that the interests of the state are 
served by not seeking more serious charges. 
[citation omitted] Accordingly, if after plea 
negotiations fail, he then procures an indictment 
charging a more serious crime, a strong inference 
is created that the only reason for the more 
serious charges is vindictiveness." 
4. 
App. 89. It seems clear on the facts of this case that the 
prosecutor's initial decision not to proceed under the 
habitual criminal statute was a sound exercise of 
discretion, based on an assessment that resp really does 
not come within the category of criminals who should be 
locked up for life. Indeed, when the prosecutor . 
cross-examined resp at trial about his knowledge of the 
meaning of "habitual criminal", resp insisted that he had 
no idea it could mean someone like him, because he had seen 
many convicts in the reformatory who had been "six-time 
losers" and had not been charged as habitual criminals. 
This is not to say that the prosecutor was not legally 
entitled to charge under the habitual criminal statute, 
which clearly was applicable, but that the prosecutor most 
likely recognized that the statute should not be applied to 
resp. 
Indeed, the inappropriateness of treating resp as 
an habitual criminal and imposing a mandatory life sentence 
subsequently was recognized by the Kentucky legislature. 
The New statute - which regulates "persistent felony 
~
offender sentencing" - applies 
5. 
"only if, for each of two previous felony 
convictions, the sentence was at least one year; 
defendant was imprisoned under each such sentence 
before commission of the instant felony; and the 
offender was over eighteen years at the time he 
committed each offense. [Resp] would not have 
been subjected to enhanced sentencing under [the 
new statute] because none of these conditions were 
satisfied." 
CA opinion, App. 84 n. 1. 
II. The Decision Below 
From reading your Aid-to-Memory, I gather that you 
believe the decision below goes too far, in that it 
establishes a "per se rule". I take it that that rule is 
that a prosecutor may not "bring an habitual offender 
indictment against a defendant who has refused to plead 
guilty to an indictment for the same unenhanced substantive 
offense", at least when "the prosecutor does not assert 
that any event occurred between the issuance of the first 
indictment and the issuance of the second to influence his 
decision except [the defendant's] insistence upon his right 
to trial." CA opinion, App. 88. I do not see anything 
unreasonable about such a rule. Of course, it must be 
justified by a holding that due process has been violated 
by the prosecutor's actions, which will be discussed 
below. But I view the holding of the court below as 
sufficiently narrow and tied to the facts of this case. It 
does not even prohibit all instances of "upping the ante"; 
it just applies to bringing an additional charge that 
carries a mandatory life sentence. Rather than the 
incremental steps normally associated with bargaining, 
bringing such a charge injects a qualitative different 
coercive element into the plea bargaining situation. 
III. Due Process 
6. 
In Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 257, the Court 
recognized that although plea bargaining may afford 
advantages to both the prosecution and the accused, "all of 
these considerations presuppose fairness in securing 
agreement between an accused and a prosecutor." Id. at 
261. And in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, which 
upheld the validity of a guilty plea despite the fact that 
it might have been entered into out of fear of the death 
penalty that the Court later held unconstitutional because 
of its deterrence of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the 
Court explicitly distinguished that case from "the 
situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, 
deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to 
induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty." 
Id. at 751 n. 8. This case presents that very situation. 
Much language in several distinct but related 
lines of cases supports - and perhaps compels - resp's 
position and the decision of the court below. Resp and the 
three California amici quote practically all of the 
relevant passages in their briefs, primarily from the 
guilty plea 
) 
cases1 and from North Carolina v. ~~arce and Blackledge 
v. Perry. The reasoning in these different lines of cases 
is concerned with different problems, but they coalesce in 
this case. 
A. The Guilty Plea Cases 
One would think that this line of cases would be 
the most helpful in analyzing the issue presented here, 
since they deal with the permissible limits of plea 
bargaining. Yet there is a critical difference between 
this case and the guilty plea cases: Resp did not plead 
guilty. He "unreasonably" (in the state's words) insisted 
on going to trial, despite the fact that by doing so he 
subjected himself to imposition of a mandatory life 
sentence. In the guilty plea cases, the defendant pleaded 
guilty and later attacked the validity of the plea on 
7. 
grounds of involuntariness or coercion. The argument, with 
several variations on the same theme, was that the plea was 
coerced and therefore involuntary because the defendant 
.. 
really had no choice. 
In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, the 
Court held the capital punishment portion of the Federal 
1. By the "guilty plea cases" I mean the Brady trilogy, 
Brady v. United States, 397 u.s. 742; McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 u.s. 790; and 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 u.s. 25. Also relevant is 
Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 257. 
Kidnapping Act unconstitutional because it placed an 
"impermissible burden" on the defendant's right to a jury 
trial. Yet in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
decided after Jackson but involving a guilty plea entered 
before Jackson, the Court held that the defendant's 
election to plead guilty rather than face the possibility 
of the death penalty was not involuntary. The majority 
(per White, J.) stated: "That the statute caused the plea 
in [a 'but for'] sense does not necessarily prove that the 
plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act." 397 
u.s. at 750. The Court reasoned that the decision to 
obtain leniency and avoid the death penalty was, in the 
absence of threats or mental coercion, rational.2 
The Court rejected Brady's theory of 
involuntariness, which the Court described as follows: 
"Brady's claim is of a different sort: that it 
violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or 
encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or promise 
of leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced and 
invalid if influenced by the fear of a possibly 
higher penalty for the crime charged if a 
conviction is obtained after the State is put to 
its proof." 
Id. at 750-51. The Court rejected this theory because it 
would undermine much of the advantage, conferred on 
prosecutor and accused alike, of plea bargaining: "we 
8. 
2. Indeed, this 
the instant case 
the overwhelming 
before a jury." 
is the corollary of the state's comment in 
that resp "unreasonably chose, in view of 
evidence against him, to stand trial 
Petr's brief at 15-16. 
cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to 
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a 
substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by 
his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime 
and to enter the correctional system. ." 397 u.s. at 
753 (emphasis added) . The Court followed the Brady 
reasoning in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 u.s. 790, 795 
("we determined in [Brady] that an otherwise valid plea is 
not involuntary because induced by the defendant's desire 
to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that 
9 . 
authorized if there is a jury trial.") (emphasis adeed), and 
in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 u.s. 25, 31. 
"The standard was and remains whether the plea 
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to 
the defendant. [Citing Boykin v. Alabama, 397 
U.S. 238, and Machibroda v. United States, 368 
u.s. 487.] That he would not have pleaded except 
for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty 
does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of 
guilty was not the product of a free and rational 
choice ••.. " 
I glean two points from the guilty plea cases. 
The first is the Court's repeated emphasis on the presumed 
fairness of the plea bargaining, meaning (a) that the 
prosecutor does not use his charging power to force or 
induce the defendant to plea guilty and (b) that if the 
plea bargaining process is legitimate, it is because there 
10. 
are mutual benefits to the prosecutor and the accused. Of 
course the prosecutor always had the upper hand, but the 
Court's mention of the clearly guilty defendant's desire to 
avoid the agony of trial and to obtain a more lenient 
sentence, and the reference to mutual "exten[sions] of 
benefit" suggest that the defendant is supposed to get 
something out of the bargaining and be better off than he 
would be by going to trial on the indictment that is the 
subject of the bargaining. This is a very different matter 
from ending up worse off than under the original indictment 
because of an insistence on Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights. This point will be pursued below at p. 
As to point (a), the meaning of "force" or 
"induce" is not clear. A major difference between the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Brady focuses on what 
this concept means. The majority seems to limit it to 
"actual or threatened physical harm or • • • mental 
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant." 397 U.S. 
at 750. Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, believed 
this to be too restrictive a definition of involuntariness. 
"[T]he legal concept of 'involuntariness' has not 
been narrowly confined but refers to a surrender 
of constitutional rights influenced by 
considerations that the government cannot properly 
introduce. The critical question that divides the 
Court is what constitutes an impermissible factor, 
or, more narrowly in the context of these cases, 
whether the threat of the imposition of an 
unconstitutional death penalty is such a factor." 
11. 
Id. at 802. 3 The point is that although the majority 
and dissent disagreed as to what constitutes 
involuntariness, they agreed that a plea would be invalid 
if "induced" by the prosecutor. 
Under the Court's holding in Brady, I would 
imagine that the inducement in the instant case would not 
have rendered resp's plea "involuntary", if he had pleaded --guilty. That is, if the original indictment had charged 
both counts (forgery and habitual criminal), and resp had 
decided to plead guilty, an attack on the validity of that 
plea would not succeed under Brady because the desire to 
avoid a life sentence is not even as great as the desire to 
avoid the death penalty. 
But the second point I glean from the guilty plea 
cases is that they are not really relevant to the instant 
case for the simple reason that resp did not succumb to 
whatever pressure was exerted by the prosecutor. He did 
not plea guilty. Some Justices might regard this as 
waiver. This is not discussed in any of the briefs. It 
seems to be the implication of the prosecutor's questioning 
of resp about whether he was not warned that the prosecutor 
would seek a harsher indictment if resp would not plead 
guilty. But any notion that there was waiver here should 
3. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in ~rady because the 
record showed that Brady had pleaded guilty for various 
reasons unrelated to fear of the death penalty. 
12. 
not prevail. Resp had two choices: he could plead guilty 
or he could insist on his right to trial. By doing the 
latter, he did not waive his right to claim either that the 
harsher indictment is invalid under Pearce and Blackledge 
v. Perry, or that a threat to indict under the habitual 
criminal statute placed an "impermissible burden" on Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights, under Jackson. The defendants 
in Blackledge and Pearce did not waive the right to 
challenge prosecutorial vindictiveness by pursuing their 
appeals instead of succumbing to the general fear of a 
higher sentence as retaliation for the exercise of 
constitutional rights. The very point of those cases was 
that even though the prosecutor did not explicitly threaten 
to seek a harsher sentence the defendant's apprehension of 
such action was sufficient to require a prophylactic rule. 
It should not matter in the instant case that the threat 
was explicit and that resp insisted on his right to trial 
despite the threat. Similarly, the defendant in Jackson 
did not waive his right to challenge the 
unconstitutionality of the capital punishment provision in 
the Kidnaping Act, on the ground that it unnecessarily 
deterred assertion of the right to a jury trial, even 
though he did not succumb and went to trial. 
Mr. Justice Brennan noted the anomaly of this 
situation in his dissent in the Brady trilogy: 
13. 
"Since the death penalty provision of the 
Kidnaping Act remains void, those who resisted the 
pressures identified in Jackson and after a jury 
trial were sentenced to death receive relief, but 
those who succumbed to the same pressures and were 
induced to surrender their constitutional rights 
are left without any remedy at all. Where the 
penalty scheme failed to produce its 
unconstitutional effect, the intended victims 
obtain relief~ where it succeeded, the real 
victims have none. 
397 U.S. at 807-08. In my opinion, Justice Brennan's 
analysis of the anomaly cannot be faulted. In terms of 
consistency, either the Brady Court should have said that 
Jackson was wrongly decided, instead of limiting it in an 
~ assailable fashion, or ~rady was wrongly decided. As 
Justice Brennan says, if fear of the death penalty was an 
impermissible factor in the decision to plead guilty, the 
plea should be open to attack. 
Since the guilty plea cases are not the most 
relevant, the instant case must be analyzed in terms -----similar to those employed in Jackson, in conjunction with 
"------------~~--~--~--the vindictiveness analysis of Pearce and Blackledge. See 
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 u.s. 17. 
14. 
B. United States v. Jackson 
In United States v. Jackson the Court struck down 
the capital punishment portion of the Federal Kidnaping Act 
because it imposed too great a burden on Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights. The statute, by requiring that a jury 
recommend imposition of the death penalty, deterred 
defendants from asserting the right to a jury trial. The 
Court's reasoning is worth stating at some length: 
"The inevitable effect of any such provision is, 
of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter 
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a 
jury trial. If the provision had no other purpose 
or effect than to chill the assertion of 
constitutional rights by penalizing those who 
choose to exercise them, then it would be patently 
unconstitutional." 
390 u.s. at 581. In Jackson the Court found that the 
statutory scheme did serve a legitimate objective, i.e., 
avoidance of the more drastic penalty of a mandatory death 
penalty. But this legitimate objective was not weighty 
enough to save the statute. 
"Whatever might be said of Congress' objectives, 
they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly 
chill the exercise of basic constitutional 
rights. [Citing Robel, 389 U.S. 258: Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 u.s. 479.] The question is not 
whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather 
than intentional: the question is whether that 
l 
effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive . 
. . • The goal of limiting the death penalty to 
cases in which a jury recommends it is an entirely 
legitimate one. But that goal can be achieved 
without penalizing those defendants who plead not 
guilty and demand jury trial •••. Congress 
cannot impose the death penalty in a manner that 
needlessly penalizes the assertion of a 
constitutional right." 
adequate safeguard existed in the judge's responsibility to 
reject coerced or otherwise involuntary pleas. 
"For the evil in the federal statute is not that 
it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury 
waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages 
them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive 
in order that it be held to impose an 
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a 
constitutional right." 
The theory expressed in Jackson is an amalgam of 
the "least restrictive alternative" theory, as indicated by 
the Court's citation of Shelton v. Tucker, and the theory 
of unconstitutional conditions. See Note, The Unconstitu-
of Plea Bargaining, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1387, 1398 
-z 
Although the Court has rejected the idea that plea 
argaining ~ ~~ is unconstitutional, it has left open the 
ossibility that beyond certain limits, plea bargaining 
ractices would be unconstitutional. It seems to me that 
the unconstitutional condition analysis in the Harvard 
Note, together with the least restrictive alternative 
4 "The individual's assertion of his constitutional 
rights may be deterred if the state makes their 
exercise costly. When an individual foregoes the 
exercise of a constitutional right in order to 
obtain or retain a benefit from the state, 
established doctrine requires that the courts 
examine such an exchange to determine if it places 
an undue burden of the exercise of the right and 
hence is unconstitutional. 
88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1398. The author goes on to 
distinguish between "unconstitutional pressures that render 
a plea involuntary" and "[u]nconstitutional conditions that 
induce waiver". The former focuses on the defendant's 
mental state; the latter involves "focuses simply on the 
presence and importance of the right and the justifications 
for penalizing its exercise." 
analysis of Jackson, suggest very strongly that the 
prosecutor cannot use the complete extent of his charging 
power in order to attempt to induce or compel a guilty 
plea. The focus is on the permissibility of the 
16. 
prosecutor's actions and not on the subjective mental state 
of the defendant, unlike the situation in the guilty plea 
cases. The prosecutor may not place an "impermissible 
burden" on the exercise of a defendant's constitutional 
right to demand a trial. Chaffin, ~upra, 412 u.s. at 35 
(quoting Jackson v. United States). 
C. Pearce and Blackledge 
You indicated in your Aid-to-Memory that Pearce 
and Blackledge are not really on point. That is true. But 
when Pearce and Blackledge are considered along with 
Jackson and much of the language in the guilty plea cases, 
the incontrovertible principle that emerges is that a 
prosecutor cannot attempt to obtain a guilty plea by taking 
action that is intended to force the defendant to give up -
his rights. The question of what is an "impermissible ---burden" can be answered by reference to the interdiction of 
vindictiveness in Pearce and Blackledge. 
Much of the language in Chaffin lends support to 
the idea of reading the ideas expressed in Jackson together 
with the Pearce/Blackledge rationale. The Chaffin Court 
focused on Pearce's emphasis on vindictiveness and 
identified the problem as "the hazard of being penalized 
for seeking a new trial". 412 u.s. at 25-26 (emphasis by 
the Chaffin Court) • This would be all the more true in a 
case where the hazard faced by the defendant is of being 
penalized for seeking a trial. The personal motive of the 
prosecutor is also a strong one in the guilty plea 
situation. Unlike the situation in Chaffin, where "the 
jury is unlikely to be sensitive to the institutional 
interests that might occasion higher sentences by a judge 
desirous of discouraging what he regards as meritless 
appeals", id. at 27 n. 13, the prosecutor seeking a guilty 
plea is motivated by a single concern: discouraging what 
he regards as a meritless trial. 
The obvious objection to this theory is that this 
is what takes place in all plea bargaining. This is the 
tenor of the state's brief, which, contrary to this Court's 
emphasis on the presumed fairness of most plea 
negotiations, describes plea bargaining as an inherently 
"coercive" process whose aim, "[b]luntly put", is "to avoid 
utilizing the jury trial system established by the United 
States Constitution." Petr's brief at 22, 10. This may be 
true in practice, but the Court refused to make this 
callous assumption when it placed its imprimatur on plea 
bargaining. The tenor of the Court's decisions is that 
plea bargaining is permissible only so long as it is fair 
and furthers legitimate objectives, one of which is 
providing the defendant some benefit. As the Chaffin Court 
made plain, "Jackso!! and Pearce are clear and subsequent 
cases have not diluted their force: if the only objective 
of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of 
constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional' 
" Chaffin, supra, 412 u.s. at 32 n. 20. 
When the prosecutor returns to the grand jury to 
seek a harsher indictment after a defendant refuses to 
relinquish his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, it is 
plain that the objective is to discourage the assertion of 
constitutional rights. The threat is made to induce this 
defendant to plead guilty; and following through on the 
threat serves as a deterrent to the exercise of these 
constitutional rights by other defendants who know what 
will happen if they insist on being tried. This is the 
chilling effect that was condemned in Pearce, even though 
it was acknowledged there that there is no constitutional 
right to an appeal. The case for prohibiting 
vindictiveness because of its effect on the right to a 
trial is even greater than the case for prohibiting 
vindictiveness because of its effect on appeals. 
It does not matter in principle that in the plea 
bargaining situation there has been no trial, and therefore 
that there is no first sentence with which to compare the 
allegedly vindictive action. This makes application of the 
constitutional standard more difficult, because it is not 
as easy to say what is vindictive in the normal plea 
bargaining situation as to identify that a higher sentence 
has been imposed. But on the facts of this case, 
application of the rule is easy because the prosecutor has 
conceded that he threatened and ultimately sought the 
hlgher charge because resp would not plead guilty. To the 
extent that the holding of CA 6 can be regarded as a ~ ~~ 
rule, it is a justifiable and narrowly tailored rule. When -a prosecutor does not charge under an enhancement statute, 
~r whatever reasons informed his decision that such a 
-~  charge would be inappropriate, it can be presumed that 
~- :d~dictiveness is the only reason for his decision to 
~~~-return to the grand jury for such a charge when the only 
~~ change in circumstances is the defendant's assertion of 
~ .~ stitutional rights. 
~ ~  The reason I say the rule is narrowly tailored is 
_, ~~ that it does not affect "plea bargaining practices such as 
~ ~ J.~ ering to amend a felony count to a misdemeanor, but upon 
~jr ·~~ r~1 t1on of the offer, seeking at trial the maximum 
r(PV , ,- -J,l\enal ty permitted for the felony offense. II PetrI s brief at 
~ ~ 2~. Although petr contends that what happened in the 
~~ ... i~ tant case "pales [by] comparison" to such a situation as 
~ ~J one just described, the California amici correctly note 
~ ~~~ that the situation described by petr is permissible because 
~~ the prosecutor has done no more than what he could have 
~~one if plea bargaining did not exist. The prosecutor has 
~~not penalized the defendant for asserting his constitu-
~ tional rights. 
~v~~ This brings me to the fundamental distinction 
~f· 
fftV 
between constitutionally impermissible "upping the ante" 
and constitutionally permissible offering of concessions. 
Resp rebuts petr's example, stated above, as follows: 
"In petr's example, the maximum penalty the 
defendant braves when he pleads not guilty is the 
maximum penalty authorized by law for the felony 
offense. If the defendant and the prosecutor 
never discuss a plea bargain, the defendant by his 
plea of not guilty will risk, at most, the 
possibility that his conviction will result in the 
imposition of the maximum sentence authorized for 
the felony. If the defendant and the prosecutor 
negotiate but the defendant declines to plead 
guilty in return for the offered amendment of the 
felony charge to a misdemeanor, the defendant, 
even though he rejected the prosecutor's offer, 
will still risk only the maximum penalty 
authorized for the original felony charge." 
It has been suggested that an affirmance in this 
case will not help defendants because prosecutors will be 
able to charge the enhancement offense from the outset and 
thereby evade the Court's decision. (Petr also notes that 
this would have an adverse collateral consequence for the 
defendant by making it harder for him to obtain bail.) The 
theory of the suggestion is that insofar as addition of the 
enhancement statute cannot be viewed as vindictive, because 
the defendant has not yet asserted any constitutional 
right, it will not be prohibited by Pearce. That is a 
correct assessment, as far as it goes. It will be an open 
question whether the prosecutor can charge under an 
enhancement, statute despite his view of its 
inappropriateness in the particular defendant's case, 
simply to gain leverage in order to obtain a guilty plea. 
My own opinion, based on all the cases discussed above, is 
that a prosecutor could not use his charging power in this 
manner, not because of Pearce but because of the 
impermissible burden on the assertion of constitutional 
rights, along the lines suggested by Jackson. 
This question need not be addressed in order to 
decided this case. The Court would be justified in making 
the assumption that prosecutors act in good faith and would 
not attempt to evade a constitutional obligation by 
bringing unwarranted charges simply to obtain bargaining 
leverage. Some leverage is necessary, of course, and is 
built into the system. But that leverage supposedly is the 
ability to make concessions to a defendant, not the ability 
to extort a guilty plea. At least under the Court's 
statements about the legitimacy of plea bargaining, there 
is a very real difference between a prosecutor's offer of 
concessions and his threats to "up the ante" if the 
defendant will not relinquish his constitutional rights. 
IV. Remedy 
The CA ordered the case remanded to the district 
court "with instructions to order petitioner's discharge 
except for his confinement under a lawful sentence imposed 
solely for the crime of uttering a forged instrument." I 
am not sure what this means. I assume it means that resp 
is required to serve the ten years to which he could have 
been sentenced on the forgery count. If so, and since resp 
has not cross-petitioned from the CA's judgment, it would 
not be open to him to request better relief. 
5 See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by 
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 u. Pa. L. Rev. 865, 
885-86 (1964): 
"The practices employed to induce guilty pleas 
should be channelled by prosecutors into those 
areas which create a minimal danger of coercion . 
. . • A prosecutor's discretion to charge multiple 
counts, where proper, should not be 
circumscribed. But a prosecutor should not 
include additional charges merely to bring 
pressure on a defendant to plead guilty." 
--' 
TheCA's language is ambiguous, however, and could 
be construed to mean that resp should be resentenced. At 
\ oral argument, it might be a good idea to ask resp's 
l counsel what relief he thinks resp was granted. 
V. Conclusion 
The Court's decision in the instant case can be 
quite narrow. No general rule need be stated; the Court 
can hold simply that the prosecutor here engaged in conduct 
that violated the guarantee of due process of law by 
attempting to coerce a guilty plea by threatening to obtain 
an habitual offender indictment that the prosecutor 
initially thought was not justified. The only change in 
circumstances between the two indictments was the 
defendant's assertion of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights. Once resp refused to plead guilty, the decision to 
seek a much harsher indictment must be viewed as motivated 
by vindictiveness under Pearce. From the perspective of 
the plea negotiations before resp refused to plead guilty, 
the threat to seek the habitual offender indictment was an 
"unnecessary and therefore excessive" use of the charging 
power calculated "needlessly [to] penalize the assertion of 
a constitutional right", which amounted to "an 
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional 
right". Jackson v. United States, supra. 
The Court need not address the question whether a 
prosecutor can bring stepped-up charges at the outset when 
the only reason for doing so is to obtain overwhelming 
6 
leverage in order to induce a defendant to relinquish 
his constitutional rights. (Neither must the Court address 
the difficult question of what kind of proof a defendant 
would have to present to prevail on such an allegation.) 
The Court may assume that prosecutors will act in good 
faith in deciding what to charge. 
N.B. 
6 I say "overwhelming" leverage because, at least in this 
case, the prosecutor had adequate leverage within the 
sentencing range of the forgery charge. using the habitual 
offender charge was needless because (a) for someone like 
resp, who was determined to go to trial no matter what, the 
additional pressure was bound to be unavailing; and (b) for 
the more usual defendant, the potential of facing ten years 
instead of five would have been adequate to cause him to 
make a rational decision in favor of pleading guilty. 
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Don Bordenkircher. Superintendent, 
Kentucky State Penitentiary, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
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On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States 
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the Sixth Circuit. 
[January -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prose-
cutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to 
reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not 
plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally 
.charged. 
I 
The respondent, Paul Lewis Hayes, was indicted by a 
Fayette County. Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a 
forged instrument in the amount of $88.30, an offense then 
punishable by a term of two to 10 years in prison. Ky. Rev. 
Stat. ~ 434.130 (repealed 1974). After arraignment. Hayes, 
his retained counsel. and the Commonwealth's attorney met 
in the presence of the clerk of the court to discuss a possible 
plea agreement. During these conferences the prosecutor 
offered to recommend a sentence of five yea.rs in prison if 
Hayes would plead guilty to the indictment. He also said that 
if Hayes did not plead guilty and "save the court the incon-
venience and necessity of a trial ," he would return to the 
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Criminal Act,' then Ky. Rev. Stat. ~ 431.190 (repea.Jed 1975). 
which would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment by reason of his two prior felony convictions.2 
Hayes chose not to plead guilty. and the prosecutor did obtain 
an indictment charging him under the Habitual Criminal Act. 
It is not disputed that the recidivist charge was fullv justified 
by the evidence. that the prosecutor was in possession of this 
evidence at the time of the original indictment. and that 
Hayes' refusal to plead guiltv to the original charge was what 
led to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute. 
A jury found Hayes guilty on the principal charge of utter-
ing a forged instrument and. in a. separate proceeding, further 
found that he had t·wicc before been convicted of felonies. As 
required by the habitual offender statute. he was sentenced to 
a life term in the penitentiary. The Kentucky Court of 
Appea.ls rejected Hayes' constitutional objections to the 
enhanced sentence. holding in an unpublished opinion that 
imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole was consti-
tutionally permissible in light of the previous felonies of which 
1 While croSl;-examining Haw~; during thr subsequent trial procerdings 
the prosecutor described the plea offer in the following lnngungr: 
"Isn't. it a fact thnt I told you 11t that time rthr initial bargninin~r session] 
thnt if you did not intend to plead guilty to fivr ~·rar, for this chargr 
and ... ~>nve thr rouri thr inronveniencr nne! necessit~· of n trial and 
tr1king up this timr that I intrndcd to rrturn to the grand jury and nsk 
them to indict you ba:;rd upon thesr prior felon~· ronvirtion;.; ?" 
~At tlw time of Hnw"' trial thr statute nrovided tlwt "ralny person 
convicted a ... third time of frlonv ... shnll br roJ,fined in the penitm-
t.inry during his life." Kv. Rrv. Stat. § 431.090 (repralPd 1975). Thnt 
f;tntute has been replarrd b~· 1\\. Rrv. Stat.~ 532.080 (1977 ~unp.) under 
which HnyeR would have bren Rentenred to. nt mo. ·t. an indeterminntc 
trrm of 10 to 20 yrar~. §532.80R (6)(b). In nddition. undrr the new 
stntute n. previous ronviC'tion i:; a bn~is for enhanr('d f:rntencing only if a. 
pri~on term of one ~·ear or more wa:; impo8rcl. thr ~entrnce or probHtion 
wns rompleted within five yrars of the prr:::rnt ofT('n~e., nne! thr offender 
was over thr age of 18 whrn thr offent:r wa~ committrd. At lrnst onr or 
Haye~;' prior ronvlctions did not meet thesr ronditions. See n. 2, infra. 
76-1634-0PINION 
BOHDENKIHCHEH v. HAYES 
·Hayes had been convicted," and that the prosecutor's decision 
to indict him as a.n habitual offender was a legitimate use of 
available leverage in the plea bargaining process. 
On Hayes' petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky agreed that there had been no constitutional violation 
in the sentence or the indictment procedure, and denied the 
writ.~ The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed 
the District Court's judgment. While recognizing "that plea 
bargaining now plays an important role in our criminal justice 
system." the appellate court thought that the prosecutor's 
conduct during the bargaining negotiations had violated the 
principles of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21. which "pro-
tect[ ed] defendants from the vindictive exercise of a prose-
cutor's discretion." Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F. 2d 42. 44. 
Accordingly, the court ordered that Hayes be discharged 
"except for his confinement under a lawful sentence imposed 
solely for the crime of uttering a forged instrument." 547 F. 
2d, at 45. We granted certiorari to consider a constitutional 
question of importance 111 the administra.tion of crimin11J 
justice. - U. S. -. 
II 
It may be helpful to clarify at the outset the nature of the 
issue in this case. While the prosecutor did not actually 
obtain the recidivist indictment until a.fter the plea conferences 
had ended, his intention to do so was clearly put forth at the 
outset of the plea negotiations. Ha.yes was thus fully informed 
of the true terms of the offer when he made his decision to 
plead not guilty. This is not a situation, therefore, where 
3 According to hi:; own (('~<timon~·. Hayr~ had pleaded guilty in 1961, 
when hr war-; 1i yrnrR old, to n chargE' of drtaining a frmule, a leSl>er 
'i'ncludrd offrn&' of rapr, nnd ~~~ a re~ult had ~rrvcd fivr year~ in the state 
rrformator~· · In HJ70 hr had bren convicted of robbPry and ::;entenced t~· . 
five yrnrt~ impri~qnmPnt, but hnd bePn rl'lra:sed on probation immrdia.telr:. 
4 'Tne OJ?Inion of thr Di:stcirt Court i:; l:r.JH'e(lot:t~dL 
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the prosecutor without notice brought an additional and more 
serious charge after plea negotiations relating only to the 
original indictment had ended with the defendant's insistence 
on pleading not guilty.r· As a practical matter. in short. this 
case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes 
as a recidivist from the outset. and the prosecutor had offered 
to drop that charge as part of the plea bargain. 
The Court of Appea.ls nonetheless drew a distinction between 
"concessions relating to prosecution under an existing indict-
ment." and threats to bring more severe charges not contained 
in the original indictment--a line it thought necessary in 
order to establish a prophylactic rule to guard against the evil 
of prosecutorial vindictiveness.{' Quite apart from this chron-
ological distinction, however, the Court of Appeals found that 
the prosecutor had acted vindictively in the present case since' 
he had conceded that the indictment was influenced by his 
desire to induce a guilty plea.7 The ultimate conclusion of 
the Court of Appeals thus seems to have been that a prosecutor 
acts vindictively and in violation of due process of law when- · 
r. Compare the presC'nt rase and United States ex l'el. Williams v. 
McMann. 436 F. 2d 103 (CA2), with United States v. Ruesga-Ma1iinez, 
534 F. 2d 1367, 1370 (CA9). 
6 "Althoup;h a. pro~ecutor mar in the cotii'~C' of plC'a 111'goti11tions offer a 
def<:>ndnnt, ronre8::>ionR rrlating to prosecut.ion undC'r nn exio<ting indict-
m<:>nt ... he mn~' not. threaten a defendant with the consequenrrs that 
morC' "rverr chnrge>: rna~· bC' brought if hC' insi~ts on p;oing to trial. When 
a prosC'cutor obtains nn indictmrnt IC'f'S >'l'vcre than thC' fncts known to him 
at the time might permit, hr rna krf: n. discrC'tionary drtermination that the 
intf'!'ests of the stntr are served by not sreking more ~erious chargrs .... 
Accordingly, if aftrr plea negotiations fa.il, he then proemr;; nn indirtmC'nt 
charging n. morr R{'riow; crime, n strong infrrenre is created th11.t the only 
reason for thr mo11e serious charge,: i,- vindietivenr"'"· Under thr:;e rircum-
st::mcr,-, the prosecutor should be rrquirrd to justify hi;; action." 547 F. 
2d, at 44-45. 
7 "In thiH case, a vindictive motive need not br inferred. The prosecutor 
has admitted it." 547 F. 2d, a.t 45. 
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ever his charging decision is influenced by what he hopes to 
gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiations. 
III 
We have recently had occasion to observe that "[w]hatever 
might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the 
guilty plea, and the often concommittant plea bargain are 
important components of this country's criminal justice sys-
tem. Properly administered. they can benefit all concerned." 
Blackledge v. Allison, 430 U. S. 63, 71. The open acknowledg-
ment of this previously clandestine practice has led Court 
to recognize the importance of counsel during plea negotia-
tions, Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742. 758, the need for 
a public record indicating that a plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242, and 
the requirement that a prosecutor's plea bargaining promise 
must be kept. Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case, 
however, did not deal with considerations such as these but 
held that the substance of the plea offer itself violated the 
limitations imposed by the pue Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Cf. Brady v. United States, supra, 397 
U. S .. at 751 n. 8. For the reasons that follow, we have con-
cluded that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in so ruling. 
IV 
This Court held in North Ca.rolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 
725, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for 
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no 
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. " The same 
principle was later applied to prohibit a prosecutor from 
reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after 
the defenqant had invoked an appellate remedy, since in this 
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situation there was also a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictive-
ness.' " Blackledge v. Perry, supra, 417 U. S .. at 27. 
In those cases the Court was dealing with the State's 
unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who 
had chosen to exercise a legal right to atta~k his original 
conviction-a situation "very different from the give-and-take 
negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecu-
tion and the defense. which arguably possess relatively equal 
bargaining power." Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 
809 (opinion of BRENN AN. J.). The Court has emphasized that 
the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay 
not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from 
the exercise of a legal right, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 
104; Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, 412 U. S. 17, but rather in the 
danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused 
for lawfully attacking his conviction. See Blackledge v. Perry, 
supra, 417 U. S .. at 26-28. 
To punish a person because he has done what the law pla.inly 
allows him to do is a. due process violation of the most basic 
sort. see North Carolina v. Pea.rce, supra, 395 U. S., at 738 
(opinion of Bla~k. J.). and for an agent of the State to pursue 
a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's 
reliance on his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional." 
Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, supra, 412 U.S., at 32-33. n. 20. See 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570. But in the "give-and-
take" of plea bargaining. there is no such element of punish-
ment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or 
reject the prosecution's offer. 
Plea bargaining flows from "the mutuality of advantage" to 
I 
defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for 
wanting to avoid trial. Brady v. United States, supra, 397 
U. S .. a.t 752. Defendants advised by competent counsel and 
protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively 
capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial per-
·sul,\.siQn, and. unlikely to be driven to falS(> self-condemnation. 
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!d. , at 758. Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea 
bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a 
guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply 
because it is the end result of the bargaining process. By 
hypothesis. the plea may have been induced by promises of a 
recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction of 
charges. anq thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty 
upon conviction after a trial. See ABA Standa.rds Relating 
to Pleas of Guilty~ 3.1 (1968); Note. Plea Ba.rgaining and the 
Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 Ha.rv. L. Rev. 564 
(1977). Cf. Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S., at 751; 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25. 
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe 
punishment clearly may have a "discouraging effect on the 
defendant's assertion of his trial rights. the imposition of these 
difficult choices [is] an inevitable"-and permissible-"attri-
bute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages 
the negotiation of pleas." Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, 412 
U. S .. at 31. It follows that, by tolerating a.nd encouraging 
the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as 
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prose-
cutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the 
defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty. Ree gen-
erally Alschuler. The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 50 (1968). 
It is not disputed here that Hayes was properly chargeable 
under the recidivist statute, since he had in fact been convicted 
of two previous felonies. In our system, so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused 
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether 
or not to prosecute. a.nd what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.s Within 
b This cn;;c doeR noj involve thr constitutional implication;; of a pro;;ecn-
t.or',.: offer during plen bargaining of adverHe or lrnient trea tment. for some 
pero'On other than the accused, sec ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment 
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the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid defini• 
tion of chargeable offenses. "the conscious exercise of some 
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal COJlstitu-
tional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately 
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race. religion. or 
other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448. 
456. To hold that the prosecutor's desire to induce a guilty 
plea is an "unjustifiable standard." which. like race or religion, 
may play no pa.rt in his charging decision. would contradict 
the very premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining 
itself. Moreover. a rigid constitutional rule tha.t would pro-
hibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with 
the defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would 
drive the prfl.ctice of plea bargaining back into the shadows 
from which it has so recently emerged. See Blackledge v. 
Allison, supra, 431 U.S .. at 76. 
There is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our 
country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries 
with it the potential for both individual and institutional 
abuse." And broad though that discretion ma.y be, there are 
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise. We hold 
only that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor 
in this case, which no more than openly presented the defend-
ant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing 
charges on which he was pla.inly subject to prosecution, did 
Procedure, Commentary 1o § 350.3, pp. 614-615 (1975), which might pose 
a greater dangN of inducing 11 fal;;e guilt~· plea by ><kewing the H~<:e~sment. 
of the risk>; n defendant mu~t com;idcr. Cf. Bmdy v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 758. 
n Thi,; potential has led to many recommendAtions tlwt the pro~ecutor's 
discretion should be controlled b~· meanH of either intrrnal or external 
guidrlines. See ALI \fodel Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 350.:3 
(2)-(3) (Hl75); ABA S1nndard,; Relnting to the Prosecution Function 
§§ 2.5. 3.9 (1971); Abrnhm~, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of 
Proscrutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. Hev. I (1971). 
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not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of AppeaJs is 
Reversed. 
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h h ' h h 141!. "''~'1 I Al t oug I agree Wl t muc of the Cour~: .. ~-?~~:rculated: 
opinion, I am not satisfied that the result is 'j:U~{' in 
this case or that the conduct of the plea bar~~ining. , 
satisfied the requirements of due process. 
Respondent was charged with the uttering of a 
single forged check in the amount of $88.30. Und~r 
Kentucky law, this offense was punishable by a prison term 
of from two to ten years, apparently without regard to the 
amount of the forgery. During the course of plea 
bargaining, the prosecutor offered respondent a sentence 
of five years in consideration of a guilty plea. I 
observe, at this point, that five years in prison for the 
offense charged hardly could be characterized as an 
especially generous offer. Apparently respondent viewed 
the offer in this light an~ declined to accept it~ he 
protested that he was innocent and insisted on going to 
trial. Respondent adhered to this position even when the 
prosecutor advised that he would seek a new indictment 
under the state's Habitual Criminal Act which would 
subject respondent, if convicted, to a mandatory life 
sentence because of two prior felony convictions. 
The prosecutor's initial assessment of 
respondent's case led him to forego an indictment under 
the habitual criminal statute. The circumstances of 
------
L. • 
respondent's prior convictions are relevant to this 
assessment and to my view of the case. Respondent was 17 
years old when he committed his first offense. He was 
charged with rape but pled guilty to the lesser included 
offense of "detaining a female". One of the other 
participants in the incident was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Respondent was sent not to prison but to a 
reformatory where he served five years. Respondent's 
second offense was robbery. This time he was found guilty 
by a jury and was sentenced to five years in prison, but 
he was placed on probation and served no time. The end 
result of these two prior convictions, for which 
respondent was not imprisoned, and conviction on a charge 
involving $88.3~ was a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment. Although respondent's prior convictions 
brought him within the terms of the Habitual Criminal Act, 
the offenses themselves apparently were not 
serious enough to result in imprisonment. But now, 
conviction on a charge involving $88.30 resulted in a 
mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life.l Persons 
convicted of rape and murder often are not punished so 
severely. 
No explanation appears in the record for the 
prosecutor's decision to escalate the charge against 
respondent other than respondent's refusal to plead 
guilty. The prosecutor has conceded that his purpose was 
to discourage respondent's assertion of constitutional 
3. 
rights, and the majority accepts this characterization of 
events. See ante, at 2 n. 1, 7. 
It seems to me that the question to be asked 
under the circumstances is whether the prosecutor 
reasonably might have charged respondent under the 
Habitual Criminal Act in the first place. The deference 
that courts properly accord the exercise of a prosecutor's 
discretion perhaps would foreclose judicial criticism if 
the prosecutor originally had sought an indictment under 
that act, as unreasonable as it would have seemed. 2 
But here the prosecutor evidently made a reasonable, 
responsible judgment not to subject an individual to a 
mandatory life sentence when his only new offense had 
societal implications as limited as the uttering of a 
single $88 forged check and when the circumstances of his 
prior convictions confirmed the inappropriateness of 
3 
applying the habitual criminal statute. I think it 
may be inferred that the prosecutor himself deemed it 
unreasonable and not in the public interest to put this 
defendant in jeopardy of·a sentence of life imprisonment. 
There may be many situations in which a 
prosecutor would be fully justified in seeking a fresh 
indictment for a more serious offense. The most plausible 
justification might be that it would have been reasonable 
and in the public interest initially to have charged the 
defendant with the greater offense. In most cases a court 
could not know why the harsher indictment was sought, and 
4. 
-an inquiry into the prosecutor's motive would be as 
inappropriate as it likely would be unfruitful. In these 
cases, I would agree with the majority th~t the situation 
would not differ materially from one in which the higher 
charge was brought at the outset. See ante at 4. 
But this is not such a case. Here, any inquiry 
into the prosecutor's purpose is made unnecessary by his 
candid acknowledgment that he "threatened" to procure and 
in fact procured the habital criminal indictment because 
of respondent's insistence on exercising his 
constitutional rights. We have stated in unequivocal 
terms, in discussing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 
570 (1968), and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 u.s. 711 
(1969), that "Jackson and Pearce are clear and subsequent 
cases have not diluted their force: if the only objective 
of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of 
constitutional rights it is 'patently 
unconstitutional.'"" Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, 412 U.S. 17, 
32 n. 20 (1973). And in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742 (1970), we drew a distinction between the situation 
there approved and the "situation where the prosecutor or 
judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and 
sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to 
tender a plea of guilty." Id., at 751 n. 8. 
I would affirm the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals on the facts of this case. The plea bargaining 
process, as recognized by this Court, is essential to the 
functioning.of the criminal justice system. It normally 
affords genuine benefits to defendants as well as to 
society. And if the system is to work effectively, 
prosecutors must be accorded the widest discretion, within 
constitutional limits, in conducting bargaining. Cf. note 
2, supra. This is especially true when a defendant is 
represented by counsel and presumably is fully advised 
ofhis rights. Only in the most exceptional case should a 
court conclude that the scales of the bargaining are so 
unevenly balanced as to arouse suspicion. In this case, 
the prosecutor's actions denied respondent due process 
because their admitted purpose was to discourage and then 
to penalize with unique severity his exercise of 
constitutional rights. Implementation of a strategy 
calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional 
rights is not a constitutionally permissible exercise of 
discretion. I therefore dissent. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. It is suggested that respondent will be 
eligible for parole consideration after serving 15 years. 
2. The majority suggests that this case cannot 
be distinguished from the case where the prosecutor 
initially obtains an indictment under an enhancement 
statute and later agrees to drop the enhancement charge in 
exchange for a guilty plea. I would agree that these two 
situations are alike only if it were assumed that the 
hypothetical prosecutor's decision to charge under the 
enhancement statute was occasioned not by consideration of 
the public interest but by a strategy to discourage the 
defendant from exercising his constitutional rights. In 
theory, I would condemn both practices. In practice, the 
hypothetical situation is largely unreviewable. The 
majority's view confuses the propriety of a particular 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion with its 
unreviewability. In the instant case, however, we have no 
problem of proof. 
3. Indeed, the Kentucky legislature subsequently 
determined that the habitual criminal statute under which 
respondent was convicted swept too broadly and did not 
identify adequately the kind of prior convictions that 
should trigger its application. At least one of 
respondent's two prior convictions would not satisfy the 
criteria of the revised statute; and the impact of the 
N-2 
statute, when applied, has been reduced significantly in 
situations, like this one, where the third offense is 
relatively minor. See ante, at 2 n. 2. 
----,.,,. ,~ 
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Although I agree with much of the Court's opinion, I am 
not satisfied that the result in this case is just or that the 
conduct of the plea bargaining met the requirements of due 
process. 
Respondent was charged with the uttering of a single forged 
check in the amount of $88.30. Under Kentucky law, this 
offense was punishable by a prison term of from two to 10 
years, apparently without regard to the amount of the forgery. 
During the course of plea bargaining, the prosecutor offered 
respondent a sentence of five years in consideration of a guilty 
plea. I observe, at this point, that five years in prison for the 
offense charged hardly could be characterized as a generous 
offer. Apparently respondent viewed the offer in this light 
and declined to accept it; he protested that he was innocent 
and insisted on going to trial. Respondent adhered to this 
position even when the prosecutor advised that he would seek 
a 1ww indictment under the State's Habitual Criminal Act 
which would subject respondent. if convicted, to a mandatory 
life sentence because of two prior felony convictions. 
The prosecutor's initial assessment of respondent's case led 
him to forego an indictment under the habitual criminal 
statute. The circumstances of respondent's prior convictions 
~re relevant to this assessment and to my view of the casc:;·. 
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Respondent was 17 years old when he committed his first 
offense. He was charged with rape but pled guilty to the 
lesser included offense of "detaining a female." One of the 
other participants in the incident was sentenced to life impris-
onment. Respondent was sent not to prison but to a reforma-
tory where he served five years. Respondent's second offense 
was robbery. This time he was found guilty by a jury and 
was sentenced to five years in prison, but he was placed on 
probation and served no time. Although respondent's prior 
convictions brought him within the terms of the Habitual 
Criminal Act, the offenses themselves did not result in 
imprisonment; yet the addition of a conviction on a charge 
involving $88.30 subjected respondent to a mandatory sen-
tence of imprisonment for life.1 Persons convicted of rape 
and murder often are not punished so severely. 
No explanation appears in the record for the prosecutor's 
decision to escalate the charge against respondent other than 
respondent's refusal to plead guilty. The prosecutor has con-
ceded that his purpose was to discourage respondent's assertion 
of constitutional rights, and the majority accepts this charac-
terization of events. See ante, at 2 n. 1, 7. 
It seems to me that the question to be asked under the 
circumstances is whether the prosecutor reasonably might 
have charged respondent under the Habitual Criminal Act in 
the first place. The deference that courts properly accord the 
exercise of a prosecutor's discretion perhaps would foreclose 
judicial criticism if the prosecutor originally had sought an 
indictment under that act, as unreasonable as it would have 
seemed.2 But here the prosecutor evidently made a reason-
1 It. is suggested that respondent. will be eligible for parole con cideration 
after serving 15 years. 
2 ThC' mnjorit~· ~uggC':;ts, ante, nt 4, t.hat this case cannot hP di:;tinguishecl 
from the ea;;p whC're t hP prosecutor initially obtains an indictmPnt under 
nn C'nhnncempnt ~>tntute a11d later agrPPs to drop the Pn11an.cemPnt. churge 
:in cxch,'lngC' for n gnnilty· plea, I would ag-ree th.at the.,e two ~ituationfl: 
76-1834-DISSENT {A) 
BOTIDENKIRCHEH v. HAYES 3 
ab1e. responsible judgment not to subject an individual to a 
mandatory lifr sentence when his only new offense had societal 
implications as limited as those accompanying the uttering of 
a single $88 forged chrck and when the circumstances of his 
prior convictions confirmed the inappropri~teness of applying 
the habitual criminal statute." I think it may be inferred 
that the prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not 
in the public interest to put this defendant in jeopardy of a 
sentencr of life imprisonment. 
There may be situations in which a prosecutor would be 
fully justified in seeking a fresh indictment for a more serious 
offense. The most pl~tusible justification might be that it 
would have been reasonable and in the public interest initially 
to have charged the defendant with the greater offense. In 
most cases a court could not know why the harsher indictment 
was sought. and an inquiry into the prosecutor's motive would 
neither be indicated nor likely to be fruitful. In those case, 
I would agree with the majority that the situation would not 
differ materially from one in which the higher charge was 
brought at the outset. See ante, at 4. 
But this is not such a case. Here, any inquiry into the 
would br nlike oulu if it were n;;:sumed that the hypothetical prosecutor'::; 
decision to chnrgf'. under the enhnncemrnt statute was occa:sioned not by 
ronsiderntion of thr public 'intere~t but by a strategy to di:scourage the 
defendant from exercising hi;; constitutionaJ rights. In theory, I would 
condemn both practic<'>'. In practice, the hypotheficnl situntion is largely 
unreviewnble. The major'ity''s view confuses fhe propriety of n particular 
rxercib-e of prosrrutorinl cti:scretion with its unrrviewability. In the 
im;tnnt cnl:!<', howrvrr, wr hnve no problem of proof. 
9 Ind<>cd, thr K<>nturk~· Legislature subsequently determined that the 
'habitual criminal :stat.u1t>'tmifer which rcxpondent was convicted swept too 
broad!~· nnd did not idrn'tify adequately the kind of prior convictions that 
should trigger it~ applic11tion. At least one of respondent's two prior 
conviction:,; would not. ~atisfy the criteria of the revised statute; and the 
impnct of thr statute, whrn applied, ha:s been reduced significantly in 
situations. like thi::; one, where the third offense is relatively minor. s~. 
•ante, at 2 n. ~... · · · 
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prosecutor's purpose is made unnecessary by his candid 
acknowledgement that he threatened to procure and in fact 
procured the habitual criminal indictment because of respond-
ent's insistence on exercising his constitutional rights. We 
have stated in unequivocal terms, in discussing United States 
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). B;nd North Ca.rolina v. Pearce, 
395 U. S. 711 ( 196~)). that "Jackson and Pearce are clear and 
subsequent cases have not diluted their force: if the only 
objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion . 
of constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' " 
Chaffi:n v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 32 n. 20 (1973). And 
in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), we drew a 
distinction between the situation there approved and the 
"situation where the prosecutor or juflge. or both, deliberately 
employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a par-
ticular defendant to tender a plea of guilty." !d., at 751 n. 8. 
The plea-bargaining process. as recognized by this Court. is 
essential to the functioning of the cri1ninal-justice system. It 
normally affords genuine benefits to defendants as well as to 
society. And if the system is to work effectively, prosecutors 
must be accorded the widest discretion, within constitutional 
limits, in conducting bargaining. Cf. n. 2. supra. This is 
especially true when a defendant is represented by counsel and 
presumably is fully advised of his rights. Only in the most 
exceptional case should a court conclude that the scales of the 
bargaining arc so unevenly balapced as to arouse suspicion. 
In this case. the prosecutor's actions denied respondent due 
process because their admitted p~rpose was to discourage and 
then to penalize with unique severity his exercise of constitu~ 
tional rights. Implementation of a strategy calculated solely 
to deter thC' exercise of constitutional rights is not a constitu~ 
tionally permissible exercise of discretion. I would affirm the 
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